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of only one factor weighing in a plaintiffs favor might not be sufficient to support a punitive damages 
award, and that the absence of all five factors would make any such award "suspect." 
Taking BMW v. Gore and State Farm into account, the Court of Appeals engaged in a lengthy 
and thorough analysis of the punitive damages review factors gleaned from those cases as they applied 
to the facts of this case. In assessing the reprehensibility of Exxon's misconduct, the Court of Appeals 
held that although Exxon had exhibited reckless misconduct in placing a known, relapsed alcoholic in 
command of a supertanker loaded with millions of barrels of oil, the misconduct did not warrant 
sanctions at the highest range allowable under the due process analysis. In addition, mitigating facts -­
including Exxon's prompt action to clean up the oil and to compensate the plaintiffs for economic losses 
-- worked to mollify, in the Court's view, the reprehensibility of Exxon's original misconduct in 
economic terms. Relying on State Farm, the Court held that the district court's imposition of punitive 
damages of $ 4.5 billion represented damages at the highest range, and was not warranted. The Court 
added that although a one-to-one punitives to harm ratio marked the upper limit in State Farm, the 
conduct at issue in this case was far more egregious and justified a considerably higher ratio; thus a five­
to-one punitives to harm ratio was appropriate. 
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the matter with 
instructions that the district court further reduce the punitive damages award to the amount of $ 2.5 
billion. In a terse final sentence, the Court stated: "It is time for this protracted litigation to end." 
Alan Katz 
Class of 2007 
COURT OF APPEALS SUSTAINS DISTRICT COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OF EQUAL 
LIABILITY IN CASE ARISING FROM A COLLISION OF A T  ANKER AND A DREDGE 
VESSEL 
The Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of equal fault in a 
collision between two vessels in a channel. While acknowledging that findings of equal fault were 
rare in court cases, the Court of Appeals found that the district court had properly identified a 
variety of negligent acts by both parties which supported its finding of equal fault. 
Stolt Achievement, Ltd., v. Dredge B.E. Lindholm 
United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 
447 F.3d 360 
(Decided April 19, 2006) 
Plaintiff ship owner appealed from a ruling of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas, complaining of various errors in the district court's resolution of its claims against 
Defendants, a dredge and its owner, in Plaintiffs action arising from the collision of its tanker and the 
dredge. 
On October 21, 2002 a collision occurred between the chemical tanker STOLT 
ACHIEVEMENT ("tanker") and the dredge boat LINDHOLM ("dredge"). The tanker was headed 
inbound down the center of the Houston Shipping Channel. The dredge was traveling outbound, hugging 
the starboard side of the channel. All vessels in the Channel are required to navigate under the Uniform 
Inland Navigational Rules. As the vessels approached, the tanker contacted the dredge and the vessels 
agreed to a customary port-to-port, "one-whistle" passing. Approximately two minutes after the initial 
contact, the captain of the dredge lost control of the vessel, causing it to sheer port toward the tanker. 
The tanker captain attempted to contact the dredge captain; when reached on the third call, the dredge 
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captain informed the tanker captain that he had lost control of the ship. The tanker captain then took 
evasive action in order to minimize the damage from the looming collision; however, the dredge 
collided with the tanker midship. 
After a two-day bench trial, the district court concluded that both vessels were responsible for the 
collision and apportioned liability equally, awarding each party 50% of damages claimed for reasonable 
repairs. Plaintiff was also awarded 50% of its loss-of-use damages. 
On appeal, Plaintiff-appellant asserted five issues: 1) the district court clearly erred in concluding 
it was negligent in causing the collision; 2) the court abused its discretion in admitting testimony from 
Defendant's expert witness; 3) the court clearly erred in not finding the dredge's negligence to be a 
superseding cause of the accident; 4) the court's equal apportionment of liability was clearly erroneous; 
and 5) the court erred in holding Plaintiff failed to prove entitlement to average adjuster's fees. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the district court for the following reasons. 
In an admiralty action following a bench trial, the factual findings of the lower court are said to 
be binding unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although evidence 
exists to support it, the reviewing court, based on all the evidence, is left with the definite impression 
that a mistake has been made. If a court's fmding is plausible in light of the record, an appellate court 
may not reverse, even though it would have weighed the evidence differently if sitting as the trier of 
fact. 
In a collision case, the applicable standard of care owed by a vessel is a combination of prudent 
seamanship, reasonable care, statutory and regulatory rules and recognized customs and uses. The Court 
took note of the Pennsylvania rule, which stipulates that when a vessel involved in a collision has 
violated a statutory duty, the burden is on the offending vessel to prove its conduct did not and could not 
have caused the collision. The Court stated in a footnote that the rule only applied to violations of 
statutes imposing a clear legal duty, not regulations requiring judgment of a particular circumstance. 
Where both parties to a collision violate statutes designed to prevent collisions, both parties can be 
assigned fault. This finding of fault can be overcome by proof that a party's statutory violation was not a 
substantial cause of the accident. 
Plaintiff challenged the district court's finding that its vessel displaced approximately 41,000 
tons of water and created a "bow wave" which pushed water in front and to the side of the ship, 
contributing to the accident. The Court of Appeals, however, while expressing reservations about the 
accuracy of the district court's finding, noted that there was ample support elsewhere for the court's 
conclusion that the tanker was negligent -- namely the tanker's excessive speed, a proximity too close to 
the centerline of the channel and a failure to heed a U.S. Coast Guard notice cautioning vessels in the 
vicinity to travel at their "slowest safe speed." Plaintiff contended the district court had used two 
differing definitions to define "safe speed;" however, the Court found that a definition of a safe speed as 
one "that does not have an adverse effect on other vessels in the area" was not inconsistent with a speed 
allowing a vessel to "take proper and effective action to avoid collision ... ," the latter stated in Inland 
Rule 6. Thus, the district court's finding of negligence was not clearly erroneous. 
On the remaining four issues, the Court of Appeals sustained the district court's rulings. With 
respect to Plaintiffs assertion that the district court erred in not finding the dredge navigator's 
negligence to be a superseding cause of the collision, the Court noted that superseding cause doctrine 
applied where a defendant's  negligence in fact substantially contributed to a plaintiffs injury, but the 
injury was brought about by a later, independent cause that was not foreseeable. The Court rejected 
Plaintiffs attempt to analogize the case at bar to Lone Star Industries Inc. v. Mays Towing Co. , 927 F.2d 
1453 (8th Cir. 1991); in that case the negligence of a barge owner (in failing to inspect his vessel and 
discover a hull crack) caused harm "different in kind" from that caused by a towing company's 
negligence (which had caused the crack in the first place) and the former was thus deemed a superseding 
cause of damage to the vessel. In this case, the Court observed that the negligence of both parties 
occurred concurrently and were not events of independent origin. Furthermore, the actions of the dredge 
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captain were not so extraordinary as to be unforeseeable to the tanker. Thus, the Court concluded the 
district court did not clearly err in refusing to find the dredge captain's negligence to be a superseding 
cause of the collision. 
With respect to the issue of equal apportionment of liability made by the district court, the Court 
referred to United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. , 421 U.S. 397 (1975), in which the Supreme Court 
discarded the divided damages rule in favor of an allocation of responsibility based on comparative 
fault. The Supreme Court had held in that case that equal apportionment of responsibility was proper 
only where the parties were equally at fault or if it was not possible to fairly measure the comparative 
degree of the parties' fault. In this case, the Court stated that apportionment of fault was not a 
mechanical exercise and that although findings of equal fault were rare, the district court had properly 
identified a variety of negligent acts by both parties which supported a finding of equal fault. 
Finally, on the issue of adjuster fees, the Court of Appeals found that a stipulation between the 
parties had merely stated the amount of fees owed and not liability for their payment. As the party 
moving for recovery, Plaintiff had the burden of showing it was entitled to the fees, and could not rest 
on the stipulation alone. Therefore, the district court was correct in denying recovery of the fees. 
For the foregoing reasons the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. 
Andrew Lemonda 
Class of 2008 
DECEDENT CONSTRUCTION WORKER RENOVATING SHIP BERTHS DEEMED A 
"HARBOR WORKER" UNDER THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT 
The Court of Appeals held that an order of the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board, 
concluding that a decedent was a "harbor worker" covered by the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, was proper, even though decedent's specific job was not uniquely 
maritime in nature, because he was engaged in construction of a maritime facility. 
Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 
444 F.3d 1095 
(Decided April 14, 2006) 
Petitioner Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. ("Healy"), entered into a contract with the United States 
Navy to renovate three submarine berthing wharves at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Subcontractor John 
Mannering ("Mannering") was retained by Healy to construct an underground concrete duct housing 
electrical and communication cables. In May 2001, Mannering employee Finefeuiaki Maumau 
("Maumau") was killed when a steel trench shield fell on him. Respondents, survivors of the decedent, 
sought benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("Act"). 
In 2002, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") appointed by a director of the Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs ("OWCP") granted the claim, awarding $1,166.78 per week in benefits, based 
on the decedent's average weekly wage during the project. The ALJ relied on past decisions in which 
the Benefits Review Board had interpreted the Act to cover construction workers involved in the 
construction of a dock housing a submarine repair facility and other maritime facilities. The ALJ 
concluded that it was irrelevant that the decedent's job duties were not "inherently maritime" in nature. 
The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board ("the Board") affirmed the ALJ' s decision. 
In holding that the decedent was a "harbor worker" within the meaning of the Act, the Board stated that 
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